Attacker Target Selection
There’s a bit of a debate going on about whether the Kaseya attack exploited a 0-day vulnerability. While that’s an interesting question when discussing, say, patch management strategies, I think it’s less important to understanding attackers’ thinking than target selection. In a nutshell, when it comes to target selection, the attackers have outmaneuvered defenders for almost 30 years.
In early 1994, CERT announced that attackers were planting network eavesdropping tools—"sniffers"—on SunOS hosts, and were using these to collect passwords. What was known in the security community but not mentioned in the CERT advisory was how strategically these sniffers were placed: on major Ethernet segments run by ISPs. Back then, in the era before switched Ethernet was the norm, an Ethernet network was a single domain; every host could see every packet. That was great for network monitoring—and great for surreptitious eavesdropping. All security people understood both halves of that equation, but the attackers realized that backbone links offered far more opportunities to collect useful passwords than ordinary sites’ networks.
Fast-forward a decade to 2003, when the Sobig.f virus made its appearance. In the words of a retrospective look, "[Tt]he whole Sobig family was incredibly significant because that was the point where spam and viruses converged." Again, that hacked computers could be used for profit wasn’t a new idea, but few defenders realized until too late that the transition had taken place in the real world.
A few years later, credit card payment processors were hit, most famously Heartland Payment Systems. This is an industry segment most people didn’t realize existed—weren’t charges and payments simply handled by the banks? But the attackers knew, and went after such companies.
The current cast of malware operators are again ahead of the game, by going after cyber-infrastructure companies such as SolarWinds and Kaseya. This gives them leverage: go after one company; penetrate thousands. The payoff might be intelligence, as in the SolarWinds hack, or it might be financial, as with Kaseya. And the ransomware perpetrators are apparently being very strategic:
Cyber-liability insurance comes with a catch, however: It may make you more vulnerable to a ransomware attack. When cyber-criminals target cyber-insurance companies, they then have access to a list of their insured clients, which cyber-criminals can then use to their advantage to demand a ransom payment that mirrors the limit of a company’s coverage.Attackers even exploit timing:
DarkSide, which emerged last August, epitomized this new breed. It chose targets based on a careful financial analysis or information gleaned from corporate emails. For instance, it attacked one of Tantleff’s clients during a week when the hackers knew the company would be vulnerable because it was transitioning its files to the cloud and didn’t have clean backups.
The challenge for defenders is to identify what high-value targets might be next. A lot of defense is about protecting what we think are high-value systems, but we’re not always assessing value in the same way as the attackers do. What’s next?
